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( 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INES C. FOWLER, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, dba 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant-
Appellant, 
Case No. 14399 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which Respondent seeks to 
recover from Appellant the reasonable value of services 
rendered as a real estate broker pursuant to an implied 
agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial to the Court sitting without 
a jury, the Court awarded Respondent judgment against 
Appellant on Respondent's first cause of action in the 
amount of $9,715.25 as a real estate broker's commission. 
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The Court also awarded Respondent judgment against 
Appellant on Respondent's second cause of action in 
the additional amount of $1,373.75 for a real estate 
sales commission, and Respondent's costs of court 
in the amount of $46.00. This appeal contests only 
that portion of the judgment awarding Respondent 
$9,715.25 for a real estate broker's commission pur-
suant to Respondent's first cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks: 
(1) Reversal of that portion of the judgment 
ordering that Respondent recover from Appellant a real 
estate broker's commission in the amount of $9,715.25 
pursuant to Respondent's first cause of action, and a 
judgment in his favor of no cause of action as a matter 
of law; or 
(2) An order reducing the amount of such 
recovery to zero; or 
(3) An order reducing the amount of such 
recovery to $250.00; or 
(4) An order reducing the amount of such 
recovery to $1,965.25; or 
(5) A new trial. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Official Report of Proceedings in the 
Trial Court will be referred to throughout this Brief 
by the letter "T." followed by the number of the 
specific page or pages referred to. Exhibits will be 
referred to as "Ex." followed by the number of the 
specific exhibit or exhibits referred to. The defendant-
appellant and the plaintiff-respondent will be referred 
to throughout as "Appellant" and "Respondent,11 respec-
tively. 
Respondent was first licensed as a real 
estate salesman in Utah in November of 1967, and was 
so licensed continually thereafter until January 1, 
1973. T. 26, 29, 84. In 1971, Respondent took and 
passed the Utah Real Estate Broker's Examination, but 
did not activate her real estate broker's license at 
that time. T. 29. In September of 1971, Respondent 
went to work for Treasure Mountain Corporation as a 
real estate salesman. T. 29. 
Appellant was first licensed as a real estate 
salesman in Utah in 1958, and became the director of 
real estate sales for Treasure Mountain Corporation 
in July of 1972. At that time, Appellant became Respond-
ent's supervisor in the Treasure Mountain Corporation 
sales office. T. 144, 145. In August of 1972, Appellant 
-3-
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Appellant could qualify for his own Utah real estate 
broker's license. Mr. Monson indicated that he was 
willing to so broker for Appellant. Mr. Monson was 
willing to so act at no charge to Appellant. T. 80, 
81, 111. 
Prior to December 20, 1972, Appellant and 
Treasure Mountain Corporation officials entered into 
negotiations to have Appellant act as an independent 
contractor for the purpose of marketing the subject 
real estate securities. T. 45, 46, 147, and Ex. 7, 12. 
Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent knew 
that Treasure Mountain Corporation and Appellant 
intended to enter into an agreement pursuant to which 
Treasure Mountain Corporation would retain Appellant 
to act as an independent contractor for the purpose 
of marketing the subject real estate securities, and 
I 
that the aforesaid securities registration was being 
amended accordingly. Respondent also knew that Appel-
lant was to receive a total commission of 3.57o on all 
i 
sales made by him and his sales personnel, of which 
2.57o would be paid to the salesman making the sale 
and 17> would be retained by Appellant. T. 35, 69-72, 
and Ex. 7. 
Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent knew 
that even though she held a license as a securities 
salesman and a license as a real estate salesman, and 
-5-
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even though Appellant held a license as a securities 
broker-dealer, she still would not be able to sell 
any of the subject real estate securities as one of 
Appellant's sales personnel unless she or someone 
else acted as a real estate broker for Appellant's 
sales organization, and that both a real estate broker's 
license and a securities broker-dealer's license were 
necessary for Appellant's sales organization in order 
for her to make any sales of the subject real estate 
securities. T. 85, 87. 
Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent and 
other salesmen in Appellant's sales organization had 
been waiting a considerable amount of time for the 
subject real estate securities to be effectively 
registered as securities and for all sales personnel 
to be properly licensed to sell. T. 110. 
Prior to December 20, 1972, in addition to 
Respondent, another of the real estate salesmen in 
Appellant's sales organization was eligible to activate 
his real estate broker's license. T. 152. 
On December 20, 1972, Appellant asked if he 
could "use" Respondent's real estate broker's license 
and requested her to activate such license with the 
Real Estate Division of the Utah Department of Business 
Regulation. Respondent agreed to Appellant's request, 
whereupon Appellant completed the necessary paperwork, 
-6-
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which Respondent signed, and which paperwork was then 
filed with the R.eal Estate Division. Respondent's 
real estate broker!s license fees and bond were paid 
for by Appellant. T. 30, 31, 152, and Ex. 20. 
On December 20, 1972, at the time Appellant 
requested and Respondent agreed to activate her real 
estate broker's license, no mention was made by anyone 
of any commission or other compensation to be paid to 
Respondent for her acting as a real estate broker for 
Appellant's sales organization, and there was no express 
agreement, written or oral, between the parties that 
any such commission or compensation would be paid. 
T. 34, 69, 84, 153. The Trial Court took judicial notice 
of the fact that Rule 19 of the Rules and Regulations 
issued by the Real Estate Division of the Department 
of Business Regulation requires that real estate brokers 
are required to provide their salesmen with the written 
terms of their employment arrangement in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding. T. 224, 225. Respondent admits 
that she should have insisted on a written agreement 
between her and Appellant with respect to any commis-
sions or compensation due her for her acting as a real 
estate broker for Appellant's sales organization. 
T. 84. 
Shortly after December 20, 1972, Appellant 
completed the necessary paperwork to open a real estate 
-7-
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broker's trust account for which Respondent would be 
responsible, and both Appellant and Respondent signed 
the signature card. Appellant alone provided the 
funds necessary to make the initial deposit in the 
trust account, and no additional monies were ever 
deposited in the account. T. 35, 68, 69. 
Effective December 29, 1972, amendments to 
the aforesaid October 20, 1972, securities registra-
tion and prospectus were amended as planned, and 
Treasure Mountain Corporation and Appellant entered 
into the anticipated agreement pursuant to which 
Appellant would act as an independent contractor to 
market the subject real estate securities. T. 45, 46, 
48, and Ex. 7, 12. 
Effective January 1, 1973, Respondent became 
the real estate broker for Appellant's sales organiza-
tion, and Appellant and two other salesmen held real 
estate licenses under her. On January 1, 1973, Appel-
lant held the securities broker-dealer's license for 
Appellant's sales organization and Respondent and two 
other salesmen were licensed for securities purposes 
under him. Respondent continued to be licensed as a 
securities salesman under Appellant until June, 1973. 
One additional salesman was licensed under both Appel-
lant and Respondent about February 1, 1973. T. 7, 8, 
149, 150, and Ex. 1. 
-8-
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After January 1, 1973, and continuing until 
February 19, 1973, Respondent incurred the risks inci-
dental to "brokering11 for Appellant's sales organiza-
tion. T. 82. Other than being the responsible real 
estate broker for up to four real estate salesmen, 
Respondent's duties between January 1 and February 19, 
1973, were the same as they were both before and after 
that period of time. T. 65, 85, 156, 157. 
Between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 
1973, the office space, office furniture, and office 
utilities and telephone service used by Appellant!s 
sales organization, including Respondent in her capa-
city as a real estate broker, were provided without 
charge by Treasure Mountain Corporation. 
Between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 
1973, Appellant was responsible for the success of his 
sales organization, including supervision of all sales 
personnel, T. 149; conducting weekly sales meetings, 
T. 64; the hiring and payment of a secretary and the 
furnishing of stationery, office supplies, etc., T. 137, 
150; and performance of the contractual obligation 
he had with Treasure Mountain Corporation, including 
making certain that all sales personnel were properly 
licensed; that his sales organization complied with 
all applicable laws and regulations, including securi-
ties laws, real estate laws, and Interstate Land Sales 
Acts; payment of all personnel; and indemnification 
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of Treasure Mountain Corporation with respect to the 
form of the Securities Registration Statements and 
Prospectus. Ex. 12. 
Between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 
1973, sales made by Appellant's sales organization 
were considered made when deposits were received 
and/or sales agreements were signed, T. 37, 116; but 
commissions were not considered earned until the sale 
was closed. Forty-two sales were made during that 
period of time but none of them were closed. T. 37, 
39, 40, 87, 92, 116, and Ex. 22, 23, 24. : 
As of January 1, 1973, Appellant's sales 
organization had a list of approximately 500 names of 
persons who had indicated an interest in purchasing 
the subject real estate securities as soon as regis-
tration thereof was effective and sales personnel were 
qualified to sell. Accordingly, Appellant's sales 
organization enjoyed brisk sales activity in January 
and February of 1973. T. 205, 207. The gross sales 
price of the real estate securities sold by Appellant's 
sales organization between January 1, 1973, and Feb-
ruary 19, 1973, was $2,193,050.00, and Treasure Moun-
tain Corporation paid to Appellant a 1% broker's 
commission on that gross, or $21,930.50. Ex. 24. 
For that same period of time Respondent earned and was 
paid a 2.5% commission on the sale of eighteen of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
subject real estate securities made by her, which 
commission amounted to $12,335.00. T. 186 and Ex. 31. 
On February 19, 1973, Appellant's Utah real 
estate broker's license became effective, whereupon 
I 
Respondent inactivated her real estate broker's license 
and became licensed as a real estate salesman under 
Appellant's license effective the same date. Respondent 
continued to act as a real estate salesman under Appel-
lant's real estate broker's license until her employ-
ment was terminated by Appellant on May 4, 1973. 
T. 35, 153. 
No mention of any real estate broker's com-
mission for Respondent was ever made by Respondent 
i 
or anyone acting on her behalf to Appellant or anyone 
acting on his behalf until on or about July 25, 1973, 
T. 35, 92, and Ex. 19. 
Appellant's overhead for the maintenance 
of his sales organization pursuant to his agreement 
with Treasure Mountain Corporation amounted to $1,500.00 
per month for all of 1973. T. 137. 
The forty-two sales made between January 1, 
1973, and February 19, 1973, were closed over a thirteen 
month period beginning February 21, 1973, as follows: 
Month No. of Sales Closed 
February 1973 2 
March 1973 2 
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Month /; No. of Sales Closed 
April 1973 
July 1973 
August 1973 
September 1973 
October 1973 
November 1973 
December 1973 
January 1974 
February 1974 
March 1974 
1 
3 
5 
1 
5 
8 
9 
4 
1 
1 
In Utah, the compensation normally paid to 
a real estate broker for the "use" of his broker's 
license varies according to the circumstances in each 
instance, and sometimes it amounts to less than 5% of 
the salesman's commission; and sometimes it might be 
$250.00 per year. T. 78-82. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS CLAIM FOR A REAL ESTATE BROKER'S 
COMMISSION IS BASED UPON AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT "AUTHOR-
IZING OR EMPLOYING AN AGENT OR BROKER TO PURCHASE OR 
SELL REAL ESTATE FOR COMPENSATION" WITHIN THE MEANING 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OF SECTION 25-5-4(5), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AND 
IS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE. 
From the foregoing Statement of Facts, it 
is clear that Respondent was not a party to any written 
or oral agreement to pay her the real estate broker's 
commission she claims. Further, the Trial Court, in 
its Conclusions of Law, concluded that any such agree-
ment between the parties was implied. See Conclusions 
of Law, Paragraph 1. 
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Certain Agreements Void Unless Written 
and Subscribed^ In the following cases, 
every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing 
or employing an agent or broker 
to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation. 
The opinion in Baugh v. Parley, 112 U. 1, 
184 P.2d 335 (1947), contains a helpful discussion of 
the meaning and effect of the foregoing statutory 
provision as follox^ s: 
... It provides that any agreement for 
the performance of services as a real 
estate broker shall be void unless in 
writing. The statute is applicable to 
contracts implied in law as any other. 
In effect, it forbids any recovery for 
-13-
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services in selling land which are not 
provided for by written agreement. See 
also Page on the Law of Contracts, 
Sec. 1413. [Emphasis added] 
The statute now under discussion was 
construed by this Court in Case v. Ralph, 
56 U. 243, 188 P. 640, 642, where, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Frick, we 
said: 
The Courts generally hold that under 
such a statute a real estate broker 
or agent cannot recover a commission 
for services rendered in either selling 
or procuring a purchaser for real 
property unless it appears: (1) that 
there is an express contract or agree-
ment of authority in which the terms 
and conditions of his employment, if 
any, and the amount of his commission, 
etc., are stated; (2) that such con-
tract be in writing; (3) that in the 
absence of such an express contract, 
no recovery can be had for the reason-
able value of the services rendered^ 
as upon a quantum meriut, nor forThe 
money and time expended for the use 
and benefit of the owner of the property. 
(Italics added) 
And in Watson v. Odell, 58 U. 276, 198 P. 772, 
775, 20 A.L.R. 280, we said: 
Under our statute, the plaintiff could 
recover a commission only by virtue of 
a contract. He could not recover as 
upon a quantum meruit"! [Citing Case v. 
Ralph, Supra.] (Italics added) 
See also Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, et 
ux., 77 U. 176, 292 P. 915. 
In Hale v. Kriesel, 194 Wis. 271, 215, N. W. 
227, 228, 56 A.L.R. 780, in construing a 
statute similar to ours, the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin said: 
These statutes leave no opportunity 
for the law to imply a contract. They 
apply to implied agreements as well as 
to those that are express, ... (Italics 
added) 
-14-
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that a 
cause of action based on an implied agreement cannot 
circumvent the plain language of our statute of 
frauds. However, the Trial Court concluded that an 
implied agreement between Respondent and Appellant as 
opposed to an implied agreement between Respondent 
and Treasure Mountain Corporation, the owner of the 
subject real property, does not come within the meaning 
and prohibition of the statute. In Anderson v. Johnson, 
108 U. 417, 160 P.2d 725 (1945), this Court held that 
an oral agreement by a broker to pay commissions to an 
unlicensed procurer of listings was not an agreement 
which involved any right or interest in land and there-
fore not made void and unenforceable by the statute of 
frauds, but it appears that the Court in Anderson v. 
Johnson had reference to a different provision of the 
statute of frauds than Section 25-5-4(5), because that 
section does not talk in terms of nany right or interest 
in land.11 There is no indication in Anderson v. Johnson 
that the Court considered the issue of whether the 
particular provision relied on by Appellant here 
applies to implied agreements like the one claimed 
by Respondent. Accordingly, as near as we can tell, 
the question is one of first impression in this Court. 
The issue may be quickly decided by con-
sidering the plain language of the subsection and two 
-15-
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propositions: (1) Note that the provision talks 
about "every" agreement "authorizing or employing" 
which, of course, broadens the provision to apply to 
any agreement providing for compensation to a real estate 
broker or agent; and (2) If the legislature did not 
really mean what the provision clearly says, it would 
have been a simple matter to state otherwise. 
However, even if one concludes that Section 
25-5-4(5) applies only to agreements between real 
estate brokers and agents and the owners of real 
property, in the case at bar, any implied agreement 
Respondent had for compensation was with Appellant as 
an agent or alter-ego of the owner of the property. 
In support of this proposition, it is important to note 
that this is not a case where a licensed real estate 
broker orally or impliedly agreed to share commissions 
with one of his salesmen or a "finder," nor is it a case 
where one licensed real estate broker orally or impliedly 
agreed to share commissions with another licensed real 
estate broker. On the contrary, at the time any 
implied agreement relied on by Respondent came into 
being, Appellant was a licensed real estate salesman 
but he was not a licensed real estate broker. Con-
sequently, Appellant was not in a position to lawfully 
act as a real estate broker or receive any compensation 
as a real estate broker. This is well established by 
-16-
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the following provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
(1953): 
Section 61-2-1. License Required. It 
shall be unlawful for any person, co-
partnership, or corporation to engage 
in the business, act in the capacity of, 
advertise, or assume to act as a real 
estate broker or a real estate salesman 
within this state without first obtaining 
a license under the provisions of this 
chapter. 
Section 61-2-18(a). Unlicensed Broker -
Action for Recovery of Compensation 
Prohibited. No person, partnership, 
association, or corporation shall bring 
or maintain action in any Court of this 
state for the recovery of commission, a fee, 
or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered, the doing or rendering of which 
is prohibited under the provisions of this 
act, to other than licensed real estate 
brokers, unless such person was duly 
licensed hereunder as a real estate broker 
at the time of the doing of such act or 
the rendering of such service. 
Based on the foregoing statutes, at the time 
Respondent was acting as a real estate broker for which 
she claims compensation, she had no legally enforce-
able claim for real estate brokerage commissions 
against Appellant because he was acting only on behalf 
of Treasure Mountain Corporation in requesting her 
brokerage services. Any legally enforceable claim 
for real estate broker's commissions during the time 
Respondent's real estate broker!s license was in 
effect would had to have been between Respondent and 
Treasure Mountain Corporation, the owner of the prop-
Yet, she had no written agreement with Treasure 
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Mountain Corporation, as required by Section 25-5-4(5), 
so any implied agreement she had is simply unenforce-
able. To hold otherwise seems to us to make Section 
25-5-4(5) meaningless, because even if Appellant had 
entered into a written agreement with Respondent, he 
could have done no more than make her a real estate 
broker of the owner's property. She certainly could 
not have been a real estate broker for Appellant with 
respect to the subject property, because he didn't 
own it. In Paragraph 7 of the December 29, 1972, 
agreement between Treasure Mountain Corporation and 
Appellant, Appellant covenanted as follows: 
To obtain and at all times during the 
term hereof maintain in full force and 
effect a license issued by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 
(the "Exchange Act"), as a broker-dealer 
and licenses covering all Salesmen as 
securities Salesmen pursuant to the 
Exchange Act, as well as all other licenses 
and permits necessary to comply with 
applicable state securities, real estate, 
and other laws and relating to all activi-
ties of and services rendered by Taylor 
and Salesmen hereunder .... Ex. 12, 
Paragraph 7(b) 
Thus, Appellant had a mandate from and an obligation 
to Treasure Mountain Corporation to obtain a real 
estate broker to act on behalf of Treasure Mountain 
Corporation. He did just that, and Respondent became 
a real estate broker for Treasure Mountain Corporation. 
The only problem is, her appointment was not in writing 
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i 
as required by our statute. Therefore, since any 
real estate broker's agreement in this case had to 
have been between Respondent and Treasure Mountain 
Corporation, the owner of the subject real estate 
securities, and since any such agreement was not in 
writing, even by the most liberal construction of 
the provisions of Section 25-5-4(5), any agreement 
Respondent had is void and unenforceable. 
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to judg-
ment in his favor, no cause of action. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THERE WAS ANY IMPLIED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In its Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 1, 
the Trial Court concluded that "there was an agree-
ment, implied in fact and in law, that defendant would 
pay to plaintiff the reasonable value of her services 
as a real estate broker11 between January 1, 1973, and 
February 19, 1973. Technically, if there was any 
implied agreement, it could not be both implied-in-
fact and implied-in-law. A contract implied-in-fact 
is based on the agreement of the parties to be inferred 
from their words or conduct. On the other hand, 
implied-in-law contracts arise not from any implied 
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agreement of the parties, but by implication of law 
in an effort to do justice regardless of any agree-
ment or presumed intention on the part of the parties. 
See 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, 
Section 2, and Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 
1956) at page 939. However, regardless of whether 
the Trial Court's conclusion is measured by the stand-
ards for an implied-in-fact contract or the standards 
for an implied-in-law contract, for the reasons dis-
cussed below, the evidence in this case is insufficient 
to support a conclusion that there was either. 
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
it should be borne in mind with respect to this Point II 
on the issue of whether any implied agreement exists, 
and Point III on the issue of the reasonable value of 
Respondent's services, on appeal of an equity case in 
Utah, the Court should review the evidence, and if a 
"clear preponderance11 of the evidence on the control-
ling points favors an Appellant, the Court should either 
enter judgment for the Appellant or remand the matter 
for further determination of such factual issues. 
See Green v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215 
(1946), amended and rehearing denied 109 U. 303, 175 
P.2d 213 (1946). 
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A. THERE WAS NO IMPLIED-IN-FACT AGREEMENT. 
The applicable rule with respect to whether 
an implied-in-fact contract exists is stated in 17 Am 
Jur 2d, Contracts, Section 4, as follows: 
... Thus, where a person performs services, 
furnishes property, or expends money for 
another at the other's request, and there 
is no express agreement as to compensation, 
a promise to pay the reasonable value of 
the services or property or to reimburse 
for money expended may properly be implied 
where, but only where, the circumstances 
warrant such an inference. [Emphasis added] 
Elaborating on certain circumstances which 
do not warrant such an inference, 66 Am Jur 2d, Resti-
tution and Implied Contracts, Section 25, provides 
as follows: 
Where no compensation is agreed upon in 
advance for services requested by and 
performed for another, the presumption 
that compensation was intended is rebutted 
by circumstances which negative such an 
intention; and one of such circumstances 
is strong self-interest in the outcome of 
the transaction by the person furnishing 
the services. The inference of a promise 
to pay for services is also negatived by 
the fact that such services when rendered 
under like circumstances customarily are 
given without compensation, or where the 
circumstances or conduct warrant a contrary 
inference or the person benefited has said 
or done nothing from which such a promise 
may be inferred, or where, at the time the 
services were rendered, it was intended, 
understood, or agreed that no payment would 
be made for them, or where the services 
were performed without authority, express 
or inferred. [Emphasis added] 
The foregoing rules of law have clearly been 
adopted in this state, as is apparent from a reading 
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of the Court's opinion in McCollum v. Clothier, 121 U. 
311, 241 P.2d 648 (1952). In that case, it was held 
that a plaintiff was entitled to recover under an 
implied contract for services rendered and expenses 
incurred in securing bidders on and buyers of machinery 
and equipment sold for the benefit of the defendant. 
In so holding, the Court stated: 
The rule applicable to the situation is 
contained in the Restatement of Agency, 
Vol. 2, Sec. 441: "Except where the rela-
tionship of the parties, the triviality of 
the services, or other circumstances indi-
cate that the parties have agreed other-
wise, it is inferred that one who requests 
or permits another to perform services 
for him as his agent promises to pay for 
them.11 
The Court went on to say of the rule that it: 
... should not be applied to bind one 
under implied contract to merely permit 
services to be rendered him, or accept 
benefits from another, under such circum-
stances that he may reasonably assume 
they were given gratuitously. The law 
should not require everyone to keep on 
guard against such possibility by warning 
persons offering services that no pay is 
to be expected. It is therefore essential 
that the Court should exercise caution in 
imposing the obligations of implied con-
tract, as contrasted to express contract 
where the parties have actually defined and 
agreed to the terms they are to be bound 
by. With such caution in mind, the test 
for the Court to apply was: Under all the 
evidence, were the circumstances such 
that the plaintiff could reasonably assume 
he was to be paid, and that the defendant 
should have reasonably expected to pay ror 
such services" [Emphasis^ added] 
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i 
What, then, does the evidence in the case 
at bar indicate with respect to negativing any implied-
in-fact agreement between the parties? We invite 
your attention to the following considerations: 
(1) Respondent's strong self-interest in the 
result of her complying with Appellant's request to 
activate her real estate broker's license negatives any 
inference of an implied-in-fact agreement. 
Prior to the December 20, 1972, conversation, 
when Appellant asked to use Respondent's broker's li-
cense and requested that she activate the license for 
use of Appellant's sales organization, Respondent knew 
the following: 
(a) That Appellant and Treasure Mountain 
Corporation intended to forthwith enter into an 
agreement that would make Appellant's sales 
organization the exclusive sales agent for the 
subject real estate securities. 
(b) That it was intended that she be 
one of the sales personnel in Appellant's sales 
organization. 
(c) That there was a large list of 
prospective purchasers of the real estate securi-
ties, which purchasers could not be contacted by 
Appellant's sales personnel until such securi-
ties were properly registered and such sales 
personnel were properly licensed. 
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(d) That the salesmen making the sales 
of the real estate securities would receive a 
2.57o sales commission on each such sale. 
(e) That she would not be able to sell 
any of the real estate securities and earn the 
2.5% sales commission unless she or someone other 
than Appellant acted as a real estate broker for 
Appellant's sales organization until such time 
as Appellant could qualify for his own real estate 
broker's license. 
Knowing what she knew, her quick willingness to comply 
with Appellant's request to use her real estate broker's 
license was extremely prudent in view of the fact that 
during the fifty-day period of time her real estate 
broker's license was in effect, Respondent personally 
sold eighteen of the condominiums or real estate 
securities, and as a result of such sales, earned a 
commission of $12,335.00. Under such circumstances, 
can there be any doubt that Appellant was justified 
in reasonably assuming that Respondent's compliance 
with his request was gratuitous? What real estate 
salesman wouldn't have complied unhesitatingly, with-
out promise of any additional compensation, in view of 
Respondent's prospects. In the language of McCollum 
v. Clothier, this Court has held that a court should 
"exercise caution in imposing the obligations of implied 
contract." With such caution in mind, the only reasonable 
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conclusion is that Respondent's self-interest in this 
case was too strong to support any implied-in-fact 
agreement. 
(2) The intentions of the parties with 
respect to compensation were clearly contrary to each 
other. 
As was said in Rasmussen v. United States Steel 
Co., 1 U.2d 291, 265 P.2d 1002 (1954), and restated 
with approval in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1974): 
... The distinction between express and 
implied in fact contracts largely is a 
difference only in mode of expression. A 
contract is express or implied by reason 
of the expression of offer and acceptance, 
--whether there is a manifestation of mutual 
assent, by words or actions or both, which 
reasonably are interpretable as indicating 
an intention to make a bargain with certain 
terms or terms which reasonably may be made 
certain. The elements are basically identi-
cal in both cases, although the evidentiary 
facts may be expressed differently. ... 
[Emphasis added] 
From the foregoing authority, it is obvious 
that whether one concludes that a contract is express 
or implied-in-fact, there must be a manifestation of 
mutual assent between the parties. In the case of 
the implied-in-fact agreement, such mutual assent 
must be inferable from some words or conduct short of 
an expressed agreement. We cannot find any evidence 
in the record now before the Court from which it 
appears that any mutual assent on the part of the 
-25-
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parties with respect to compensation of Respondent may 
be inferred. On the contrary, Respondent's own testi-
mony clearly negates any notion that there was any 
mutual assent with respect to what Respondent was to 
receive as compensation. At trial, with respect to 
the December 20, 1972, conversation with Appellant, 
in response to questions from her own counsel, Respond-
ent testified as follows: 
(0) Mrs. Fowler, was there any discussion 
with respect to brokerage commissions? 
(A) He only said that it was good for me 
to activate my license. 
(Q) So the subject wasn't mentioned at all? 
(A) No, not at all. He didn't approach 
the subject. 
(Q) At that time, what expectations did 
you have, if any, respecting commissions? 
(A) Well, all the sales for Treasure 
Mountain Corporation had been done on the 
premises that the broker will get 1% 
commission on all sales. 
(Q) And that was your expectation? 
(A) And that was my expectation. He was a 
salesman and I was a broker, and I expected 
to be paid as a broker. T. 34, 35. 
In the face of that testimony, the Trial Court none-
theless inferred that notwithstanding Respondent's 
expressed intention to take the full 1% brokerage com-
mission, she and Appellant impliedly mutually agreed 
that she be paid the reasonable value of her services. 
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If Respondent had testified that she expected 
to be paid a "reasonable amount11 or if she had testi-
fied that she expected to be paid "something,11 then 
the Trial Court may have had some reasonable basis for 
concluding as it did. However, it is obvious that the 
Trial Court did not feel that the full 1% commission 
was the reasonable value of Respondent's services, 
because the Trial Court awarded Respondent approxi-
mately $12,000.00 less than what she had stated she 
intended to receive. Thus, the Trial Court's own 
finding as to the reasonable value of the services 
performed is directly contrary to the proposition that 
there was any mutual assent on the part of the parties. 
Such conclusion can be reached without bothering to 
point out that Appellant clearly did not intend to 
pay Respondent the full 17o broker's commission, and at 
the same time put up his securities broker-dealer's 
license and pay out of his own pocket all of the ex-
penses incidental to running his sales organization, 
other than those expenses paid for or incurred by 
Treasure Mountain Corporation. Surely, no one can 
believe that Appellant intended that Pvespondent be paid 
the full 1% broker's commission. Accordingly, Respond-
ent's own testimony confirms the lack of any mutual 
assent sufficient to serve as the foundation for an 
implied-in-fact agreement. 
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If Respondent were permitted to prevail in 
spite of her own testimony, in other words, if Respond-
ent really intended to take the whole 1% of the broker-
age commissions for herself, can anyone believe that 
if she had revealed that to Appellant, he would have 
agreed to pay her that amount? How then can we permit 
her to collect even one-half of that amount on the 
theory of an implied-in-fact contract when she admits 
that that is not what she intended. If we permit her 
to collect even one-half of that amount, such recovery 
becomes the result of the fact that she was clairvoyant 
enough or lucky enough to have simply kept quiet about 
the matter of compensation at the time Appellant 
requested her services as a real estate broker. She 
thus is permitted to accomplish by her silence what 
she clearly would not have been able to accomplish 
had she been forthright enough to express her intentions 
to Appellant. 
(3) By Respondent's own admission, there 
was no agreement between her and Appellant with respect 
to her compensation as a real estate broker. 
At trial, Respondent further testified on 
cross-examination as follows: 
(Q) I would like to know, Mrs. Fowler, 
exactly what discussions you and Mr. Taylor 
had about payment of commissions from 
January 1 of [sic] February 19, 1973. 
(A) Mr. Taylor was very inaccessible to me. 
He came to the office just like a breeze. 
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(Q) Was there any agreement between you? 
(A) No, there was no agreement. The only 
agreement was that all the things that he 
had filed with the real estate division--
(Q) You mean the State Real Estate Division? 
(A) --the State Real Estate Division that 
he had knowledge that he was a salesman under 
me. T. 69. 
Here, Respondent clearly admits that there was no 
agreement between her and Appellant other than the 
documents on file with the State Real Estate Division, 
which, of course, had nothing to do with Respondent's 
compensation as a real estate broker. See Ex. 1. 
Here again, then, Respondent has clearly admitted that 
there was no mutual assent between the parties with 
respect to her compensation as a real estate broker. 
While Respondent may still be heard to contend that the 
law in the interest of justice should allow her recovery 
on an implied-in-law theory, her own testimony is such 
that there was no implied-in-fact agreement between the 
parties. 
(4) There can be no implied-in-fact contract 
in the event that the law with respect to such agreement 
has not been complied with. 
Section 61-2-5(b) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) speaking of the powers of the State Securities 
Commission provides as follows: 
(b) The Commission is vested with the power 
and authority to make and enforce such rules 
and regulations connected with the application 
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for any broker's or salesmanTs license, and 
the revocation or suspension thereof, as 
shall be deemed necessary to administer and 
enforce the provisions of this chapter. 
Pursuant to such rule-making authority, the Securities 
Commission, through the Real Estate Division of the 
Department of Business Regulation, adopted the following 
rule with respect to real estate brokers and salesmen: 
19. Broker-Salesman Disputes. Brokers are 
required to treat salesmen and other brokers 
ethically and in accordance with good, 
accepted business practices. Brokers are 
required to provide salesmen with the terms 
of employment in writing to avoid misunder-
standing. 
... [Emphasis added] 
The Trial Court took judicial notice of the 
fact that the foregoing Rule 19 was applicable to the 
present controversy. 
Speaking to the issue of whether an implied-
in-fact contract can be inferred without fully complying 
with all of the laws pertaining thereto, this Court 
stated, in 1974, in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 
at page 654, that Mno contractual liability can be 
created without compliance with11 the applicable ordi-
nances. In the face of that holding, and in view of 
the fact that any implied agreement Respondent had with 
Appellant was in her capacity as a real estate broker 
and in his capacity as a real estate salesman, in view 
of the fact that the above-quoted Rule 19 requires the 
broker, not the salesman, to reduce the terms of their 
-30-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agreement to writing,' and in view of the fact that at 
trial, Respondent testified upon cross-examination as 
follows: 
(Q) And with your knowledge of real estate, 
Mrs. Fowler, can you explain to me why on 
January 1, 1973, that you didn't insist upon 
a written contract of some type with Mr. Taylor 
to take care of your brokerage fee, such as 
you did on February 29 of 1973? 
(A) It was his idea. It wasn't mine. 
(Q) What was the reason why you didn't 
do this on January 1 of 1973, with you and 
Mr. Taylor or the other salesmen? 
(A) I should have done it. There was no 
time to discuss it with Mr. Taylor. He came 
in with the papers ready to be signed. He 
had negotiated everything. It was all 
arranged. All I did, as I could see the 
papers, was sign, because those papers had 
to be submitted to the real estate division 
before the 31st of December. 
it surely cannot be said that any implied-in-fact agree-
ment relied on by Respondent complied with theother 
relevant provisions of State law. 
Furthermore, from a purely equitable point of 
view, Respondent's failure to reduce to writing any under-
standing on her part with respect to her compensation as 
a real estate broker makes it unconscionable that she be 
permitted to have failed to discharge such duty, wait 
another seven months before the matter is ever discussed, 
claim a $21,930.50 fee based on her unilateral inten-
tion, and then recover $9,715.25. It wasn't until 
July 25, 1973, that the subject was ever broached, and 
not only was that seven months after the December 20, 
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conversation, it was five months after she was no longer 
a real estate broker for AppellantTs sales organization, 
and two and a half months after her employment with 
Appellant was terminated. It is also important to note 
that five real estate securities sales for which she 
claims she was entitled to a real estate broker!s 
commission were closed between February 21, 1973, and 
April 30, 1973, and still she made no demand for the 
real estate broker's commission with respect to those 
sales until July 25, 1973, and then through her attorney 
she demanded the full 1% commission. See Ex. 19, 22, 
23, 24. Given that kind of dilitoriness, a "clear 
preponderance" of the evidence could lead one to believe 
that the idea of claiming a real estate broker's commis-
sion at all was an afterthought. However, that need 
not be decided because whether it was an afterthought or 
not, to wait so long to raise the issue was clearly 
inequitable and negatives any inference that Appellant 
agreed to pay Respondent anything for the use of her 
real estate broker's license. 
B. THERE IS NO IMPLIED-IN-LAW AGREEMENT. 
On the issue of whether the Trial Court was 
justified in concluding that there was an implied-in-
law agreement between the parties, that is, whether 
the equities were such that notwithstanding any mani-
festation of mutual assent on the part of the parties, 
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the law should nonetheless imply that such a contract 
existed in the interest of justice, we direct your 
attention to two Utah cases previously cited in this 
Brief. In Baugh v. Parley, cited earlier in Point I 
with respect to the statute of frauds issue, the plain-
tiff sued the defendant to recover for unjust enrich-
ment. (The terms "unjust enrichment," "quasi-contracts," 
"contracts implied in law," and "restitution" are largely 
interchangeable. See 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and 
Implied Contracts, Sections 1, 2, and 3.) The facts 
i n
 Baugh v. Parley were that the defendant had orally 
agreed to sell certain real property to the plaintiff, 
and the plaintiff in turn had located a buyer that 
was willing to pay plaintiff a higher price for the 
same property. Upon discovering that plaintiff!s 
buyer was willing to pay the higher price, the defend-
ant refused to sell to the plaintiff, then sold to the 
plaintiff's buyer and refused to pay anything to the 
plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff could not 
recover for unjust enrichment, the Court stated at 184 
P.2d 337, "Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when 
he has and retains money or benefits which in justice 
and equity belong to another." The Court then went on 
to say: 
The mere fact that a person benefits another 
is not of itself sufficient to require the 
other to make restitution therefor. Restate-
ment of Restitution, Section 1, Comment C. 
Services officiously or gratuitously furnished 
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are not recoverable. Restatement of Resti-
tution, Section 2. Nor are services per-
formed by the plaintiff for his own advantage 
and from which the defendant benefits inci-
dentally , recoverable] See Restatement of 
Restitution, Section 40, Comment C; and Section 
41(a)(i). [Emphasis added] 
In Rapp v. Salt Lake City, cited previously with respect 
to the issue of whether there was an implied-in-fact 
agreement in this case, this Court stated as recently 
as 1974 as follows, at 527 P.2d 654: 
In effect, plaintiff's argument on appeal 
is directed toward enforcing a quasi-
contractual obligation, which is imposed 
by the law for the purpose of bringing about 
justice without reference to the intention 
of the parties. Such obligations are not 
true contracts but are based on unjust 
enrichment or restitution. The promise is 
purely fictitious and is implied in order 
to fit the actual cause of action to the 
remedy. The liability exists from an im-
plication of law that arises from the facts 
and circumstances independent of agreement 
or presumed intention. Where the facts 
indicate a duty of the defendant to pay, 
the law imputes to him a promise to fulfill 
that obligation. In states distinguishing 
actions of contract from actions of tort, a 
proceeding at law for restitution is an 
action of contract. Thus again plaintTff 
encounters the statutory requirements which 
mandate his contractual obligation is void 
without fulfillment of the requisiEe 
formalities. [Emphasis added] 
Applying the foregoing authorities to the facts 
in the case at bar, at trial, Respondent did not prove 
the existence of an implied-in-law agreement, for the 
following reasons: 
(1) Respondent's services were gratuitous 
and self-serving and were performed for her own substan-
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As has been stated earlier, with respect to 
whether Respondent proved an implied-in-fact agreement, 
Respondent making her real estate broker's license 
available at the request of Appellant was to her own 
substantial advantage and complying with such request 
was incidental to the benefits she received. At the 
time of Appellant's request, if Appellant had stated to 
Respondent that he was not willing to pay her any com-
pensation for the use of her real estate broker's 
license, can it really be doubted that she would not 
have gone ahead and put up her license in order to 
insure that she would have been able to sell the subj-
ect real estate securities as soon as the registration 
thereof became effective, and earn the $12,335.00 she 
received for the sales she personally made between 
January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973. 
(2) There can be no implied-in-law contract 
without fulfillment of the requisite formalities. 
The law does not permit the creation of an 
implied-in-law agreement without compliance with the 
requisite formalities, any more than the law permits 
the creation of implied-in-fact agreement without such 
compliance. In addition to what we have said earlier, 
with respect to implied-in-fact agreements, note that 
this Court in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, speaking with 
respect to implied-in-law agreements, said that such 
"contractual obligation is void without fulfillment of 
• -35-'' V 
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the requisite formalities." Thus, Respondent's failure 
to comply with Rule 19 of the applicable rules and regu-
lations of the State Securities Commission pertaining 
to real estate brokers and salesmen clearly makes 
Respondent's "unjust enrichment" claim unenforceable. 
Aside from the formal technicalities of such 
a holding, such a holding is entirely just and equit-
able. Why should Respondent, who played the role of the 
real estate broker in this whole matter, be absolved of 
her legal responsibility for putting the agreement, if 
any, in writing; be permitted to remain silent with 
respect to the matter of her compensation for over seven 
months and then come to court and recover $9,715.25 
from one of the real estate salesmen licensed under 
her. 
(3) Justice does not require Appellant to 
compensate Respondent for herservices. 
After activating her real estate broker's 
license as requested by Appellant, the evidence is 
uncontroverted that Respondent performed no services 
for Appellant that she did not perform prior to acti-
vating her license, except (a) she opened (but never 
used) a real estate broker's trust account with a bank; 
and (b) she took the risk of being responsible for the 
real estate sales activities of three to four real 
estate salesmen for a period of fifty days. 
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On the other hand, Appellant took all of the 
executive, management, and supervisory responsibility, 
and entrepreneurial risk with respect to the whole 
sales operation that benefited both of them. 
He, not she, paid the fees for her real 
estate broker's license and bond. 
He, not she, put up the money for the initial 
and only deposit in her real estate broker's trust 
account. 
He, not she, bargained for and negotiated the 
agreement giving his sales organization, including 
her, something to sell. 
He, not she, incurred the contractual obliga-
tion to perform the agreement with Treasure Mountain 
Corporation, including making certain that all sales 
personnel were properly licensed; that his sales organi-
zation complied with all applicable laws and regulations, 
including securities laws, real estate laws, and inter-
state land sales acts; payment of all personnel in his 
sales organization; and indemnification of Treasure 
Mountain Corporation with respect to the form of the 
securities registration statements and prospectus. 
He, not she, supervised the sales organization. 
He, not she, conducted weekly sales meetings. 
He, not she, hired and paid for a secretary. 
He, not she, paid all of the expenses of the 
sales office other than those expenses paid for or 
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incurred by Treasure Mountain Corporation, and such 
net expenses attributable to earning the 1% brokerfs 
commission were $1,500.00 per month for all of 1973. . 
He, not she, took the risk of closing all of 
the sales on which she claims a real estate broker's 
commission, because all of such sales were closed 
when he was the responsible real estate broker. 
All of the foregoing Appellant did without 
requesting or receiving any indemnification from 
Respondent. 
All of the foregoing Appellant did during a 
time when Respondent certainly was not indispensable, 
because Appellant had a real estate broker friend who 
was willing to broker for him without receiving any 
compensation therefor, and there was in Appellant's 
sales organization another real estate salesman who 
was eligible to activate his real estate broker's 
license to broker for the organization. 
Based on the foregoing considerations, the 
record in this case is not such as to support a con-
clusion that the law ought to create an implied-in-law 
agreement in the interest of justice. 
It also appears that regardless of whether 
one is determining Respondent's rights by whether there 
was an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law agreement, 
the record does not support the Trial Court's conclu-
sion that there was either one, let alone both. For 
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the same reasons, the Court should enter judgment in 
favor of Appellant and against Respondent, no cause of 
action. 
POINT III 
1
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES 
PERFORMED BY RESPONDENT WAS $9,715.25. 
The record makes clear that Treasure Mountain 
Corporation paid Appellant gross brokerage commissions 
in the amount of $21,930.50 for the period between 
January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973. The Trial Court 
found that between those dates Appellant incurred ex-
penses in the amount of $2,500.00 and that therefore 
the net brokerage commissions recovered by Appellant 
for the subject period of time amounted to $19,430.50. 
The Trial Court further found that the reasonable value 
of the services performed by Respondent was one-half of 
such net commissions, or $9,715.25, and then concluded 
as a matter of law that Respondent's measure of recovery 
was said reasonable value of her services. See Con-
clusions of Law, Paragraph 2. 
Appellant has no quarrel with the Trial Court' 
conclusion that Respondent's measure of recovery in 
this case, if she is entitled to any recovery at all, 
is the reasonable value of her services. In Utah, it 
appears that the measure of recovery is the same regardl 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of whether the implied contract on which recovery is 
predicated is said to be implied-in-fact or implied-
in-law. As was said in Baugh v. Parley, Supra, with 
respect to an implied-in-law count: I!. . . in an action 
for unjust enrichment, in those cases where there is a 
proper equitable basis for the same, the measure of 
damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reason-
able value of the services rendered." Likewise, in 
Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 U. 514, 236 P.2d 341 (1951), 
this Court held with respect to implied-in-fact contracts 
that the law 
... requires that he who accepts service from 
him who unofficiously performs under circum-
stances justifying the latter in reasonably 
assuming he would be compensated must pay the 
reasonable value thereof. As is more clearly 
explained by Professor Williston in Section 41 
of his monumental work on contracts, "It is by 
no means uncommon for those who offer or agree 
to employ others or to buy goods, to make no 
statement as to the wages or price to be paid. 
The law invokes here (as likewise where an 
agreement is indefinite as to time) the stand-
ard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the fair 
value of the services or property is recover-
able on the implied in fact contract. 
A year later, in McCollum v. Clothier, Supra, the Court 
held that there was an implied contract requiring the 
defendant to pay for the reasonable value of the plain-
tiff's services. Again in 1964, in Richards and Soren-
son v. Lake Hills, 15 U.2d 150, 389 P.2d 66 (1964), 
this Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision allowing 
recovery on an implied agreement to pay reasonable com-
pensation and allowed recovery "on the basis of usual 
charges for such services." 
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Based upon the foregoing, it appears that 
whether you call the measure of recovery nthe reason-
able value of services rendered,M the "usual charges 
for such services,'1 or "unjust enrichment," the result 
is the same. For example, if a property owner accepts 
improvements to his property that cost his benefactor 
$5,000.00 but appreciates the value of his property by 
$10,000.00, the property owner has been unjustly en-
riched only to the extent of $5,000.00 or the reason-
able value of his benefactor's services. 
Applying the foregoing rules of law to this 
case, what is the reasonable value of the services 
Respondent performed pursuant to any implied agree-
ment? 
At trial, no one, not Respondent, not Appellant, 
nor any expert witness, rendered any opinion as to the 
reasonable value of Respondent's services in light of 
all the circumstances of this case. Robert Monson, an 
experienced Utah real estate broker, testified that 
the compensation that should be paid a real estate 
broker for the use of his license depends on the cir-
cumstances of the situation; that he had brokered for 
a third party on one occasion for a whole year for a 
fee of $250.00; that he personally would have brokered 
for Appellant in this case without any compensation; 
but he was never asked what was the custom in the indus-
try for compensating a real estate broker under the 
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circumstances of this case. Respondent herself testi-
fied that she intended to get the whole 1% broker's 
commission. However, as noted above, what she intended 
to recover has nothing to do with the measure of recovery 
but only whether the parties could reasonably be said to 
have intended any agreement to pay compensation in the 
first place. In short, no one testified that it is the 
custom in the real estate industry in the state of Utah, 
given the facts and circumstances of this case, to 
equally split the net securities and real estate broker-
age commissions received. Accordingly, Respondent 
simply did not carry the plaintiff's burden of proof 
with respect to proving the reasonable value of Respond-
ent's services. At the very least, then, we contend 
that Appellant is entitled to a new trial on that 
issue. 
In the alternative, we request an order and 
judgment holding that the reasonable value of Respond-
ent's real estate broker's services for the time in 
question is zero or no more than $250.00. There is 
justification for the latter holding, based on the 
evidence in the record that Mr. Monson would have 
performed the same services as Respondent without any 
charge to Appellant and that he had "brokered" for a 
third party for a year's time for $250.00. Respondent 
brokered for Appellant for only fifty days. 
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A new trial; or such reduction in the amount 
of the judgment seems to be supported by the Court's 
opinion in Wooldridge v. Wareing, Supra, wherein on 
the issue of the amount of the recovery for breach of 
an implied-in-fact contract, the Court said: 
Since the trial Court found there was no 
express contract between the parties, and 
since both parties concur, we must determine 
whether the $4,000.00 award was based on 
any substantial evidence. Plaintiff con-
tended the award should have been far greater, 
and defendant asserted it should have been 
much less, or nothing at all. Both sides 
discussed at length "net profits," "50-50 
split," "sales discount," and the like, but 
the record discloses that the sales price 
of [the] equipment on the ... sale was almost 
exactly $80,000.00, 5% of which would be 
$4,000.00, the amount adjudged by the Court. 
The only uncontroverted satisfactory evi-
dence of value for services rendered in 
similar cases was elicited by defendant's 
own expert witness, who testified that the 
customary commission paid in industry to a 
casual dealer who assists in effecting a 
sale was 5% of the sale price of the equip-
ment, which testimony, taken together with 
other evidence adduced, is sufficient to 
justify the award. [Emphasis added] 
At the case at bar there is no evidence in 
the record discussing the "50-50 split" used by the 
Trial Court in arriving at the amount of the judgment, 
nor is there any evidence as to the custom in any case 
where securities broker-dealer and real estate broker 
commissions are to be shared. 
Further, even if the Trial Court concluded 
correctly that the reasonable value of Respondent's 
real estate broker's services was equivalent to one-half 
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of the net commissions received by Appellant, the 
record is clear that Appellant's net commissions were 
far less than the $19,430.50 found by the Trial Court. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that Appellant incurred 
expenses attributable to earning securities and real 
estate brokerage commissions at the rate of $1,500.00 
per month for all of 1973. The evidence is also 
uncontroverted that not one single sale on which such 
brokerage commissions were paid was closed during the 
period between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973. 
This means that in order for Appellant to have grossed 
the $21,930.50 in brokerage commissions he received, 
all of which was received between February 21, 1973, and 
sometime in March of 1974, he incurred expenses at the 
rate of $1,500.00 per month at least through 1973.i 
Accordingly, rather than being given credit for $2,500,00 
in expenses for January 1, 1973, to February 19, 1973, 
Appellant should have been given credit for expenses 
in the amount of $1,500.00 for the twelve months of 
1973, or $18,000.00. If Appellant is given credit 
for such expenses, the net commissions he received for 
the period in question were only $3,930.50, one-half of 
which would be $1,965.25. 
Such calculation does not take into considera-
tion any of Appellant's expenses with respect to closing 
the six sales that were closed in 1974. Accordingly, 
at the very most, Respondent would be entitled to 
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I 
recover $1,965.25 as the reasonable value of her real 
estate broker's services for the period in question. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests an 
order granting a new trial on the issue of the reason-
able value of Respondent's services, or requests an 
order reducing the amount of Respondent's recovery to 
zero or $250.00 or $1,965.25. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the applicable provisions of the 
Utah Statute of Frauds makes any implied agreement 
between the parties void and unenforceable, and 
because the Trial Court erred in concluding that there 
was an implied-in-fact and/or implied-in-law agreement 
between the parties, Appellant is entitled to a judg-
ment in his favor and against Respondent, no cause of 
action as a matter of law. In the alternative, Appel-
lant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of the 
reasonable value of Respondent's services to Appellant, 
or an order reducing the amount of the judgment to 
zero or $250.00 or $1,965.25. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kent B Linebaugh 
JARDINE, JOHNSON AND BALDWIN 
700 Commercial Security Bank 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
532-7700 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 1st day of April, 1976, two copies 
of this Brief of Appellant were served upon counsel for 
Plaintiff-Respondent by delivering such copies to the 
office of Bryce Roe, of Roe and Fowler, at 340 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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